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Abstract
Different types of dynamics have been studied in repeated game play, and one of them
which has received much attention recently consists of those based on “no-regret” algorithms
from the area of machine learning. It is known that dynamics based on generic no-regret
algorithms may not converge to Nash equilibria in general, but to a larger set of outcomes,
namely coarse correlated equilibria. Moreover, convergence results based on generic no-regret
algorithms typically use a weaker notion of convergence: the convergence of the average plays
instead of the actual plays. Some work has been done showing that when using a specific no-
regret algorithm, the well-known multiplicative updates algorithm, convergence of actual plays
to equilibria can be shown and better quality of outcomes in terms of the price of anarchy can be
reached for atomic congestion games and load balancing games. Are there more cases of natural
no-regret dynamics that perform well in suitable classes of games in terms of convergence and
quality of outcomes that the dynamics converge to?
We answer this question positively in the bulletin-board model by showing that when em-
ploying the mirror-descent algorithm, a well-known generic no-regret algorithm, the actual plays
converge quickly to equilibria in nonatomic congestion games. This gives rise to a family of al-
gorithms, including the multiplicative updates algorithm and the gradient descent algorithm as
well as many others. Furthermore, we show that our dynamics achieves good bounds on the
outcome quality in terms of the price-of-anarchy type of measures with two different social costs:
the average individual cost and the maximum individual cost.
Finally, the bandit model considers a probably more realistic and prevalent setting with
only partial information, in which at each time step each player only knows the cost of her
own currently played strategy, but not any costs of unplayed strategies. For the class of atomic
congestion games, we propose a family of bandit algorithms based on the mirror-descent algo-
rithms previously presented, and show that when each player individually adopts such a bandit
algorithm, their joint (mixed) strategy profile quickly converges with implications.
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1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium is a widely-adopted solution concept in game theory, which is used for predicting
the outcomes of systems consisting of self-interested players. We are interested in repeated game
play, and a Nash equilibrium describes a steady state in which the system would stay once it is
reached. However, this raises the issue of how such a state can be reached. In fact, for a general
game, computing a Nash equilibrium is believed to be hard (according to the PPAD-hardness results
[15]), so an equilibrium may not be reached in a reasonable amount of time in general, and the
outcomes that we have observed may all be far out of any equilibrium, which would render the study
on equilibria meaningless. To address this issue, a line of research is to consider natural efficient
dynamics which players have incentive to follow, and study how the system evolves according to
such dynamics.
• Best or better response dynamics. One natural dynamics is the best or better response
dynamics, in which a deviating player at each time makes a best or better change in his/her
strategy to improve his/her payoff given the current choice of the other players. This means
that, for a player to deviate, there must be enough information regarding the current choice
that the others had made. It is well-known that such dynamics leads to pure Nash equilibria
in congestion games. However, a player may not have incentive to play this way because
making such deviations may not be beneficial if other players also deviate at the same time.
• Generic no-regret dynamics. One may argue that a plausible incentive for a player is to
maximize his/her average payoff through time, and dynamics based on “no-regret” algorithms
from the area of online learning (e.g., [34, Chapter 4]) have thus been proposed in the study.
The no-regret property is preserved in full or partial information models of feedback by a
variety of algorithms. For a nonatomic routing game, it is known that if each infinitesimal
player plays any arbitrary no-regret algorithm, the “time-averaged” flow and flows at most
time steps would be at some type of approximate Nash equilibrium [10]. For a “socially
concave” game, a similar time-averaged convergence result is also known [20].1 Convergence
to a Nash or approximate Nash equilibrium is not always the case in general, and playing
arbitrary no-regret algorithms can result in a larger set of outcomes than Nash equilibria,
namely coarse correlated equilibria.2 Nevertheless, if one only cares about the outcome quality
and the quality is measured by the price of anarchy [30] with the average individual cost, it is
known that the price of total anarchy achieved by such no-regret algorithms can still match
the price of anarchy at Nash equilibrium in special games, such as atomic congestion games
[11] or even a wider class of smooth games [36]. On the other hand, there are broad classes
of games and natural measures of outcome quality for which large gaps are known between
no-regret outcomes and Nash equilibria.
Notice that the convergence results mentioned above are, instead of the convergence of the
actual strategy, about the convergence of the time-averaged strategy [10, 20] or flows at most
time steps being close to equilibria [10]. Even in the latter case, those time steps where
flows are close to equilibria are arbitrarily distributed over time (not guaranteed to gather
toward the end in time), which means that a flow at some very late point in time can still
be far away from any equilibria and flows may not stabilize. The guarantees are still not
1Note that the games that we consider here are not socially concave.
2See, for example, [37, Proposition 3.1] among others that discuss this.
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on the convergence of the actual plays. Such results are useful if the goal is to solve the
computational problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium, but they may not
tell us much about how the system actually evolves. In particular, even though the time-
averaged play converges to an equilibrium or most plays are close to equilibria, the actual
strategy may not converge and may be far away from an equilibrium. For many applications,
for example, that require the system to stabilize, the time-averaged play convergence or most
plays being close to equilibria may not be enough.
• Multiplicative updates dynamics with full information. Although it is nice to be
able to have general positive results on what generic no-regret algorithms can achieve, one
may wonder if going from generic no-regret algorithms to specific ones could yield stronger
results, in terms of convergence or quality of outcomes that the algorithms converge to. One
of the best known no-regret algorithms is the Multiplicative Updates (MU) algorithm [31, 25].
Kleinberg et al. [28] studied this for atomic congestion games in the full information setting,
in which players have full information about the cost functions so that they can determine the
cost of every other strategy they could have used given other players strategies at the current
round. It was shown that if each player employs such an MU algorithm, the actual joint
mixed strategy profile of players converges to a pure Nash equilibrium with high probability
for most games. Note that here it is the actual joint strategy profile, instead of the time-
averaged one, which converges. Furthermore, since the set of pure Nash equilibria can be a
very small subset of correlated equilibria, the price of total anarchy achieved this way can be
much smaller than that by a generic no-regret algorithm.
• Multiplicative updates dynamics with bulletin-board posting. In another work [29],
Kleinberg et al. studied the smaller class of load balancing games, but in the more stringent
partial-information setting of the “bulletin-board” model, in which players only know the
actual cost value of each edge according to the actual strategies played at the current round.
They showed that if all the players play according to a common distribution (i.e., mixed
strategy) and update the distribution using such an MU algorithm, the common distribution
converges to some symmetric equilibrium of the nonatomic version of the game. As a result,
the price of total anarchy achieved this way is also considerably smaller than that by a generic
no-regret one. However, their analysis relies crucially on the assumption that all the players at
each round play according to the same distribution. This assumption may not be reasonable
in other settings or in other games, which makes the applicability of their analysis somewhat
limited. On the other hand, the analysis in [28] can do without the assumption and deal
with general asymmetry in players’ probability distributions, but it only works in the full
information model.
Note that there is no equilibrium selection for the best (or better) response dynamics and generic
no-regret dynamics, and they could converge to the worst corresponding equilibrium. Nonetheless,
the results of multiplicative updates dynamics suggest that the dynamics converge to a subset of
mixed outcomes, namely, pure Nash equilibria with high probability in [28] and quite uniformly
distributed mixed Nash equilibria in the case of bulletin-board load balancing [29, Lemma 6]; the
price-of-anarchy type of efficiency gets better since the worst (mixed) Nash equilibrium in the
induced subset could be better than the worst the worst coarse correlated equilibrium, meaning
equilibrium is selected by the dynamics.
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These results of multiplicative updates, which form a good comparison and complement to
each other, along with the results on generic no-regret plays motivate our quest for other classes
of learning dynamics in suitable classes of games and settings. Are there more cases of natural
no-regret dynamics that perform well in suitable classes of games in terms of convergence time
and quality of outcomes that the dynamics converge to? We first answer this question positively
by providing a family of such dynamics in the bulletin-board model for the class of nonatomic
congestion games with cost functions of bounded slopes. More precisely, we show that in such
a game, if each infinitesimal player individually plays some type of the mirror-descent algorithm
[7], a well-known general no-regret algorithm, then their joint strategy profile quickly converges to
an approximate notion of Wardrop equilibrium.3 We also show that our dynamics achieves good
bounds on the quality of outcomes in terms of the price-of-anarchy type of measures with two
different social costs: the average individual cost and the maximum individual cost.
All the previously mentioned results are based on somewhat generous information models.
For instance of congestion games, edge cost functions are assumed common knowledge in the full
information model of [28] so that players can determine the costs of currently unplayed strategies
if they were used. A bit more stringent information model than full information was considered
for the load-balancing games in [29] and for the general congestion games in our results previously
mentioned, in which the edge cost functions are not common knowledge anymore, but still the cost
values of all paths at each step are assumed available through “bulletin-board” posting. With such
global information, players can get a grasp of the costs corresponding to played and even unplayed
strategies, which allows players to update their strategies better and makes convergence of the
whole system potentially easier. However, such an assumption on the information availability may
not always be realistic and may limit the applicability of these results.
The “bandit” model in online learning on the other hand considers a probably more realistic
and prevalent setting, in which at each time step each player only knows the cost of her (or his) own
currently played strategy, but not any costs of unplayed strategies. This gives rise to the dilemma
between exploration and exploitation which players have to face. In the area of online learning,
many bandit algorithms with no-regret guarantee have been developed, including for example those
based on the multiplicative updates algorithm for the experts problem [3] and those based on the
gradient-descent algorithm for online linear or convex optimization [1, 24]. However, not much is
known in the area of game theory for playing repeated games in the bandit model. Although similar
convergence results of average plays can be established immediately for bandit algorithms with no-
regret guarantee, we are not aware of any previous result establishing convergence of actual plays
in the bandit setting. In fact, it is not clear how to design bandit algorithms with such convergence
guarantee.
A natural attempt, following the standard approach for designing bandit algorithms such as
those in [3, 1, 24], is to come up with estimates of the true cost values and feed these estimates to a
full information algorithm, to replace the true cost values that are available in the full information
setting. For this approach to work for most problems in online learning, it simply suffices to
guarantee these estimates being “unbiased”, in the sense that their expected values equal the true
cost values. However, in the setting of repeated game playing, using such unbiased estimates
does not seem to ensure convergence of actual plays in general. This is because these estimates,
even with guarantee on expected values, can still have high variance and thus have actual values
3Wardrop equilibrium can be seen as Nash equilibrium specialized for games with infinitely many agents [39] such
as nonatomic congestion games.
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very different from the true cost values. Unfortunately, this is indeed the case for adapting most
existing bandit algorithms, as their estimates actually can take very different values from the true
cost values with some probability (for example, see the one-point gradient estimate in [24]) although
these estimates are enough for their goal of just achieving no regret therein. In particular, when
using such estimates in, for example, mirror descents, each update step may go in a very different
(possibly in almost opposite) direction from the desired one according to the true cost values, which
does not seem likely to result in convergence to equilibrium. This motivates us to ask the question:
are there natural classes of bandit algorithms which selfish players individually have incentive to
adopt (by the no-regret property) and the whole system will quickly converge to an approximate
Nash equilibrium (even just for some classes of instances) with social cost guarantees?
We then answer this more challenging question affirmatively as well. For the class of atomic
congestion games, we propose a family of bandit algorithms based on the mirror-descent algorithms
presented in the first-half part, and we mainly show that when each player individually adopts such
a bandit algorithm, their joint strategy profile quickly converges. The reasons why we focus on
atomic congestion games instead of nonatomic ones are two-folded: the bandit algorithm for atomic
congestion games can be applied for nonatomic congestion games, by treating the joint (mixed)
strategy profile of an atomic game directly as the joint (pure) strategy profile (i.e., flow distribution)
of a nonatomic game; the bandit informational setting is not well defined for nonatomic congestion
game since players can split their flows to literally all the allowed paths and get all the path costs.
In the bandit model, each player can only update her own strategy according to very limited and
local information about the whole system, but we show that when each player individually adopts
any such bandit algorithm, the whole system still quickly converges, and is to an approximate
mixed-strategy equilibrium that has a small approximation error in many natural cases (but has a
large approximation error in general) and is beneficial to the society as a whole. This is not only
reminiscent of the result of convergence to some specific mixed Nash equilibria in load balancing
with bulletin posting [29] (so a better price-of-anarchy type of efficiency is possible), but also more
generally for atomic congestion games like in [28]. This may appear even less expected than that
in the bulletin-board or full-information model, where each player at least has more abundant and
more global information available.
We provide definitions and some preliminaries in Section 2. First, the generalized mirror-descent
algorithm and convergence result in the bulletin-board model are presented in Section 3. The bandit
algorithm and convergence result are then presented in Section 4. Approximate equilibria and the
outcome quality bounds in terms of the price-of-anarchy type of measures are discussed along with
the convergence results. We summarize with conclusions and future work in Section 5.
1.1 Discussion of Our Results and Techniques
Bulletin-Board Model
The mirror-descent algorithm in fact can be seen as a family of algorithms. By instantiating
it properly, one can recover the MU algorithm, the gradient-descent algorithm, as well as many
others, and our result establishes the fast convergence of all these algorithms at once. Let us stress
that as in [28, 29], our notion of convergence is the stronger one: what converges is the actual joint
strategy profile. Note that in the congestion game, different players naturally have different sets of
strategies, so it is no longer reasonable to assume that all the players use the same distribution to
play as in [29]. Therefore, we allow players to use different distributions and moreover, we allow
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players to update according to different learning rates. Still, we manage to prove the convergence,
just as [28] but in the more difficult bulletin model and with a concrete bound on convergence time.
Furthermore, we provide bounds on the price-of-anarchy type of measures achieved by our
dynamics, in terms of the average individual cost and the maximum individual cost. Using the
average individual cost as the social cost, we show that the ratio between the social cost achieved
by our dynamics and the optimal one approaches some constant, which depends on the slopes of
the cost functions. Using the maximum individual cost as the social cost, we show that the ratio
between the social cost achieved by our dynamics and the optimal one also approaches the same
constant in symmetric games. In each case, there is a tradeoff between the ratio we can achieve and
the time it takes: by letting the system evolve for a longer time, it will get closer to an equilibrium,
and the resulting ratio will approach closer to that constant.
Our main technical contribution is the convergence of our dynamics to an approximate equi-
librium. To show this, we consider a smooth convex potential function of the game which has
the joint strategy profile of players as its input. The interesting observation is that although each
player individually applies the mirror descent algorithm to his/her own strategy using costs related
only to him/her, we show that the updates performed by all the players collectively can be seen
as following some generalized mirror descent process on the potential function. The generalized
mirror descent allows different step sizes in different dimensions,4 and we need this generalization
because we allow different learning rates for different players. The standard mirror descent, on
the other hand, has the same step size across all the dimensions, so that it moves at each time in
exactly the opposite direction of the gradient vector. It is known that doing the standard mirror
descent on a smooth convex function leads to a fast convergence to its minimum [9, 33]. However,
our generalized mirror descent no longer moves in the opposite direction of the gradient vector as
different step sizes have different scaling effects in different dimensions, and therefore it is not clear
if the process would still converge. Interestingly, we show that a similar convergence result can also
be achieved, which may be of independent interest (since this works for all games with a smooth
convex potential function satisfying some properties). Finally, let us remark that the standard
mirror descent algorithm, instead of the generalized one, has also been used for different problems
in game theory: for finding market equilibria in Fisher markets [9] and convex potential markets
[16]. Our convergence result for the generalized mirror descent algorithm is an extension of that
for the standard one.
Bandit Model
To be able to achieve convergence in the bandit model, the first hurdle we have to overcome is for
each player to have good enough estimates for the true costs of all her allowed paths. As discussed
before, we would like these estimates to have actual values (rather than expected values) close to
the true cost values, but the estimation methods used in [3, 1, 24] do not work. In fact, an apparent
difficulty is that a player can only learn the cost of one single path at each time, but the cost of
each path actually depends on how other players choose their paths at that time, which may be
very different at different times. Then how can a player possibly obtain good estimates for the true
costs of those unchosen paths at that time? Inspired by the bandit algorithm in [34, Chapter 4.6],
we consider dividing the time steps into episodes and letting each player play the same (mixed)
strategy at each step during an episode. The expected cost of each path then becomes the same for
4This is similar to adaptive optimization methods such as in [19].
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each step in an episode, and this allows a player to obtain a good estimate for the expected cost
of each allowed path, simply by choosing each path an enough number of steps and averaging the
costs. With such good estimates, each player can then update her strategy for the next episode
by feeding these estimates to the bulletin-board mirror-descent algorithm, to replace the true path
costs it needs.
To prove our convergence results, we would like to follow the approach used in the bulletin-
board model by showing that the collective update of all the players together corresponds to doing
some generalized mirror descent on a convex function. However, as we consider the atomic version
of the congestion game instead of the nonatomic version, there are more hurdles that we need to
clear. The first is the choice of the function for analyzing the convergence of our dynamics, as the
potential function Φ used in the bulletin-board model is defined over nonatomic flows of players.
Actually, the function used to show the convergence of dynamics does not have to be the potential
function (for ensuring existence of equilibria) of the game under study as long as the converged
outcomes via such used function can be interpreted in the game under study. We find the same
function Φ still suitable for us, by seeing each player’s mixed strategy as a nonatomic flow. Note
that this has been similarly used in atomic load balancing [29] where their mixed strategies are like
converging to equilibrium flows of the nonatomic version of load-balancing games, translated into
quite uniformly distributed mixed Nash equilibrium in the atomic version. Yet, this causes a subtle
problem. Namely, the gradient of Φ actually corresponds to path costs according to nonatomic
flows rather than those according to atomic flows that players in our atomic game have access to.5
This results in a non-negligible amount of error in the estimation of the gradient vector, which
seems unavoidable for nonlinear cost functions, and we can at best do an “approximate” mirror
descent with such an approximate gradient vector.
However, the convergence analysis in the bulletin-board model relies crucially on being able to
move (in the mirror space) precisely in the oppositive direction of the gradient vector, in order to
guarantee that the Φ value decreases, while it is not hard to find cases with increased Φ value when
moving in a slightly different direction. We bypass this difficulty by showing that as long as the
current Φ value compared to the minimum one is still considerably large, relative to the error of
the approximate gradient vector, the next Φ value will decrease from the current one by some large
amount. This provides us a way to bound the number of steps needed to reach a Φ value within
some distance of the minimum one, with the distance dictated by the errors of the approximate
gradient vectors.
The convergence also implies an approximate equilibrium in mixed strategies6 with a caveat
that the approximation can be bad in general to make such equilibrium meaningless. Nevertheless,
there are broad classes of instances when such approximate equilibrium is indeed meaningful: the
approximation error can be small for some classes of cost functions, for example, linear cost functions
and even more generally, when bounds (constant with respect to the amount of flow, not necessarily
to the inputs of an instance) on second derivatives are small enough; for some classes of structures
of allowed paths, the approximation error can still be small, for example, in the load-balancing
setting like in [29].
5Note that exactly the same problem was faced in studying multiplicative updates in atomic load balancing under
the bulletin-board model [29], where they eventually showed the convergence of mixed strategies using the nonatomic
version of load-balancing games and its potential function. Even without a bandit problem, an error due to this
occurred there, too.
6There can be alternative definitions of approximate equilibrium.
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1.2 Related Work
There are numerous works regarding reaching various notions of equilibria in congestion/potential
games in general: PLS-completeness [21] and inapproximability [38] of computing Pure Nash equi-
libria, best-response types of dynamics for converging to approximate equilibria [17, 5] or connected-
component-based “sink equilibria” [26]. There are studies of no-regret algorithms in zero-sum
game play [18], game play by selecting strategy profiles to query the corresponding payoffs [22],
etc. Playing arbitrary no-“swap”-regret algorithms converges to correlated equilibria [34, Chapter
4.4.3] while playing arbitrary no-regret algorithms results in coarse correlated equilibria [37, Propo-
sition 3.1]. That is to say that the no-regret property is enough to guarantee (coarse) correlated
equilibria in general. On the other hand, our focus is to propose specific classes of no-regret algo-
rithms for players to have incentives to adopt, with actual convergence guarantee even with bandit
feedback.
Our modeling framework in this article is most similar to that in [28]. A vector of the probabili-
ties for the all available actions for each player is maintained. Players sample an action according to
this distribution at each time. Initially, the probabilities can be all equal, i.e., uniform distribution.
Every time each player updates the weights multiplicatively preferring actions of low cost, which
generalizes the weighted majority algorithm introduced by Littlestone and Warmuth [31] and the
Hedge algorithm of Freund and Schapire [25]. Kleinberg et al. showed that if players use such
dynamics to adjust their strategies in atomic congestion games, then game play converges to a
subset of mixed Nash equilibria, so-called weakly stable equilibria. Pure Nash equilibria are weakly
stable by definition, and the converse was shown true with probability 1 when congestion costs are
selected at random independently on each edge.
Kleinberg et al. [29] also studied the performance of learning algorithms in load-balancing
games, i.e., congestion games on parallel links, under the “bulletin board model” in which players
assess edge costs according to the actual cost incurred on that edge, and not the hypothetical cost
if the player had used it. This algorithm for specifying a mixed strategy at each time step is a
version of the Hedge algorithm [25], modified so that players assess edge costs according to the
actual cost incurred on that edge, and not the hypothetical cost if the player had used it for players
that do not use the edge at this time step. It was shown that the bulletin board variant of Hedge
is also a no-regret learning algorithm. Their main result is that the expected makespan of the
outcome is bounded by O(log n) where n is the number of links/players, exponentially better than
the known lower bounds for arbitrary no-regret algorithms. Many of our assumptions regarding
atomic splittable congestion games follow [29], and the analyses for convergence share some high-
level intuitions.
Even-Dar et al. studied a subclass of concave games called socially concave games in [20]. They
showed that if each player follows any no-external regret minimization procedure, then the dynamics
will converge in the sense that the average action vector will converge to a Nash equilibrium. Even
if we change convexity to concavity and costs to utilities in our paper, potential games that we
consider here are not socially concave games. Thus, their results do not directly apply.
Besides the dynamics based on no-regret learning algorithms, some other works design Marko-
vian rerouting policies in congestion games [23, 2], where an agent’s behavior only depends on the
outcome of the immediately previous round and not on all the previous rounds. In nonatomic con-
gestion games, inspired by so-called replicator dynamics [40] the algorithms of Fisher at al. [23], for
an agent, adaptively sample paths with a probability proportional to the fraction of agents using
this path and reroute with a chosen probability if the latency of the sampled path is smaller than
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that of the current one. They showed a bicriteria result, an upper bound on the total number of
rounds in which it does not hold that almost all agents have a latency close to the average latency.
Note that such “equilibria” are transient in the sense that these equilibria can be left again even af-
ter they are reached. This is more like in [10], but not the actual convergence in our stronger sense.
Nevertheless, with exploration uniformly at random on unused paths, convergence to a Wardrop
equilibrium can now be achieved, and for symmetric games they gave a polynomial bound on the
number of rounds taken to get close to the optimal potential value.
Ackermann et al. [2] used what they called “concurrent imitation dynamics”, which is very
similar to the rerouting policies of [23], in atomic congestion games and mainly gave similar results
for symmetric atomic congestion games where the analysis needs to take probabilistic effects into
account. They first showed a convergence to a local minimum of the potential in pseudopolynomial
time. Their main result is a stronger bound on the expected time to reach an approximate stable
state in which at most a very small fraction of the agents deviate by more than a very small fraction
from the average latency. Finally, with a suitable combination of imitation with exploration that
samples other strategies directly, they guaranteed convergence to Nash equilibria and gave the
expected convergence time.
For a generic two-player coordination game, Mehta et al. [32] showed that, starting from
all but a zero measure of initial probability distributions, a discrete multiplicative weight update
algorithm known as discrete replicator dynamics converges to pure Nash equilibria. This is not like
the randomized results in [28, 29]. Their results only require that any row/column of the payoff
matrix consist of distinct entries, and hold even if the game has uncountably many Nash equilibria.
There is still a variety of different dynamics in repeated games. Auletta et al. [4] presented
general bounds on the mixing time of “logit” dynamics for classes of strategic games. In the logit
dynamics, individual participants act selfishly and keep responding according to some partial noisy
knowledge in the complex system. In particular, they proved nearly tight bounds for potential games
and games with dominant strategies. Kleinberg et al. [27] analyzed a game with a unique Nash
equilibrium, but where natural learning dynamics only cycles, not converging to this equilibrium.
They showed that the outcome of this learning process is optimal and has much better social welfare
than the unique Nash equilibrium. Balcan et al. [6] showed that convergence may not lead to any
meaningful notions of equilibria, but may result in good efficiency in terms of some objectives.
2 Preliminaries
Nonatomic Congestion Games. In this article, we first consider the nonatomic congestion
game described by (N,E, (Si)i∈N , (ce)e∈E), where N is the set of commodities, E is the set of edges
(resources), Si ⊆ 2E is the collection of the allowed paths (the allowed subsets of resources) for
commodity i, and ce is the cost function of edge e, which is a nondecreasing function of the amount
of load on it. A commodity is a “pseudo-player”, which we simply call a “player” throughout the
discussion of nonatomic congestion games, meaning that a player herself does not act as a selfish
party, but the infinitesimal parties that a player is composed of do. We describe it in more detail
in the following.
Let us assume that N = {1, . . . , n}, |E| = m, and each player has a load of 1/n (so the total
load is 1). Each player consists of a huge infinite number of selfish agents (or see each player as
a group of infinitesimal players of the same type). The agents of player i split the load of player
i so that each agent has a small (infinitesimal) amount ∆ of load, i.e., ∆ → 0. Each agent of
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player i must choose one single path s from Si and put that ∆ amount of load all on s. We call
the “aggregated” result of such choices of agents of player i the strategy of player i, and it can be
represented by a |Si|-dimensional vector xi = (xi,s)s∈Si , where xi,s ∈ [0, 1] is the amount of the
load that the agents of player i puts on the path s. Note that
∑
s∈Si xi,s = 1/n and let Ki be the
feasible set for all such vectors xi. Then the strategies of all players can be jointly represented by
a vector
x = (x1, ..., xn) = ((x1,s)s∈S1 , ..., (xn,s)s∈Sn) ∈ Rd,
where d =
∑
i∈N |Si|, and let K = K1 × · · · × Kn be the feasible set for all such vectors x. Each
allowed path of a player intersects at most k allowed paths (including that path itself) of that
player. We call xi the flow of player i and x the flow of the system.
7 Note that an edge e ∈ E can
be shared by different paths, and the aggregated load on e, denoted by `e(x), is
∑
s:e∈s
∑
i∈N xi,s.
The cost of a path s is defined as cs(x) =
∑
e∈s ce(`e(x)), and the individual cost of player i is
defined as Ci(x) =
∑
s∈Si xi,scs(x). Each agent of player i chooses a path s from Si that minimizes
cs(x) in nonatomic congestion games.
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Such a game admits the following potential function (e.g., see [35, Eq. (1)], and it can be found
as early as in [8]):9
Φ(x) =
∑
e
∫ `e(x)
0
ce(y)dy. (1)
To see that this is indeed a potential function, note that if some player deviates an infinitesimal
fraction of load from s to s′ (where xi,s > 0) such that cs(x) > cs′(x′) (where x is almost the same
as x′ except for the small fraction of moved load), then ∂Φ(x)/∂xi,s > ∂Φ(x′)/∂xi,s′ , which means
that the rate of decrease in Φ is larger than the rate of increase in Φ and thus the resulting Φ
decreases. We will need the following, which we prove in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. The function Φ defined in (1) is convex.
Atomic Congestion Games. We later consider the atomic congestion game, also described by
(N,E, (Si)i∈N , (ce)e∈E). Let us assume that there are n players, each player has at most d allowed
paths, and each path has length at most m; let k be the maximum number of the allowed paths
(including that path itself) of a player that each allowed path of that player intersects, and each
player has a flow of amount 1/n to route. The strategy of each player i is to send her entire flow
on a single path, chosen randomly according to some distribution over her allowed paths, which
can be represented by a |Si|-dimensional vector pii = (pii,s)s∈Si , where pii,s ∈ [0, 1] is the probability
of choosing path s. It turns out to be more convenient for us to represent each player’s strategy pii
by an equivalent form xi = (1/n)pii, where 1/n is the amount of flow each player has. That is, for
every i ∈ N and s ∈ Si, xi,s = (1/n)pii,s ∈ [0, 1/n] and
∑
s∈Si xi,s = 1/n. Let Ki denote the feasible
set of all such xi ∈ [0, 1/n]|Si| for player i, and let K = K1 × · · · × Kn, which is the feasible set of
all such joint strategy profiles x = (x1, . . . , xn) of the n players.
7Although we borrow the terms such as edge, path, and flow from routing games, the congestion games are more
general as there are no underlying graphs and a path can be just any arbitrary subset of edges.
8One can show that our dynamics are no-regret algorithms for each agent of each player i, and this provides an
incentive for the agents to adopt the dynamics. If, instead of each agent choosing a path s to minimize cs(x), the
agents of player i cooperate to minimize the cost of player i, Ci(x), we have an atomic splittable congestion game.
9Note that our convergence result will be proved more generally for any convex potential function satisfying certain
properties.
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We will still be using the same function as in (1) for convergence analysis. We are aware of
the potential function of Rosenthal for atomic congestion games (see [28] for the potential function
there), typically used for showing existence of pure Nash equilibria. Actually, different functions
could be used for different purposes. For our purpose of doing mirror-gradient descents on some
convex function to show actual convergence, the function that we are using guarantees convexity
(while the Rosenthal one does not) and thereby other convenience for analysis.
To represent which path a player i actually chooses, we use another vector Xi = (Xi,s)s∈Si ∈
{0, 1/n}|Si|, where
Xi,s =
{
1/n if player i chooses path s,
0 otherwise.
(2)
We call X = (X1, . . . , Xn) the choice vector of the n players. Then the cost of a path s with respect
to X is defined as
cs(X) =
∑
e∈si
ce(`e(X)),
where `e(X) is the amount of flow passing through edge e, defined as
`e(X) =
∑
j∈N
∑
r∈Sj :e∈r
Xj,r. (3)
A useful property of the choice vector X is that as each player i chooses path s with probability
pii,s = xi,sn, the expected value of each Xi,s is exactly xi,s, which implies that E [Xi] = xi for each
i and E [X] = x.
Properties and Social Costs. As in [29], we assume that the cost functions satisfy the property
that for any y ∈ [0, 1] and any e ∈ E, ce(0) = 0, ce(1) ≤ 1, c′e(y) ≥ A > 0 and 0 ≤ c′′e(y) ≤ B, where
A,B are positive constants.10 By Lemma 4 of [29], for constants a = A and b = B + 1 defined
accordingly, the cost functions satisfy the condition that
ay ≤ ce(y) ≤ by, for any y ∈ [0, 1]. (4)
Then the function Φ defined in terms of such cost functions is smooth in the following sense.
Definition 1. A function Φ over K is called (α, β, λ)-smooth if for any x ∈ K,
Φ(x) ≤ α, ‖∇Φ(x)‖∞ ≤ β, and ∇2Φ(x)  λI.
Proposition 2. The function Φ defined in (1) with cost functions satisfying condition (4) is
(α, β, λ)-smooth, for
α = bm/2, β = bm, and λ = bmk.
We will prove the proposition in Appendix B.
We consider two types of social cost functions. The first is the average individual cost function,
defined as
CA(x) =
∑
e
`e(x)ce(`e(x)),
10They are constants with respect to the amount of flow, not necessarily to m or n.
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and the second is the maximum individual cost function, defined as
CM (x) = max
s∈S
∑
e∈s
ce(`e(x)), where S =
⋃
i∈N
Si.
Using them, we measure the quality of outcome for a flow x ∈ K in the following two ways.
The first is the ratio CA(x)/CA(x
∗), where x∗ = arg minz∈K CA(z), and the second is the ratio
CM (x)/CM (xˆ), where xˆ = arg minz∈K CM (z).
3 The Bulletin-Board Model
3.1 Dynamics
We consider the setting in which the players play the game iteratively in the following way. At step t,
each player i plays the strategy xti by sending the amount x
t
i,s of load on path s for each s ∈ Si. After
that, she gets to know the vector cˆti = (cs(x
t))s∈Si of cost values, where cs(xt) =
∑
e∈s ce(`e(x
t))
is the cost value on the path s at that step. With this, she updates her next strategy xt+1i in
some way and then proceeds to the next iteration. In the alternative definition of the game, the
corresponding setting is that at step t, each agent of player i sends its load of ∆ all on some path
s ∈ Si, which is chosen according to some distribution. We assume that all agents of player i
start with the same initial distribution and update their distributions at each step t using the same
algorithm according to the same information cˆti. Then we can conclude that their distributions at
step t are all the same,11 which basically can be described by the flow xti of player i, due to the law
of large number as the number of agents is huge. Thus, the settings for the two definitions of the
game also match.
We have not specified how the players or agents of players update their next strategies. Different
update algorithms may make the whole system evolve in rather different ways, and we would like to
understand if there are update algorithms which players or agents of players have incentive to adopt
that can lead to desirable outcomes for the whole system. One can argue that a plausible incentive
for a player is to minimize her regret. Two well-known no-regret algorithms are the gradient descent
algorithm and the multiplicative update algorithm, both of which can be seen as special cases of a
more general algorithm called mirror descent algorithm (see e.g. [7] for more detail). Inspired by
this, we consider the following update rule for player i or agents of player i:
xt+1i = arg min
zi∈Ki
{
ηi〈cˆti, zi〉+ BRi(zi, xti)
}
(5)
= arg min
zi∈Ki
BRi(zi, xti − ηicˆti). (6)
Here, ηi > 0 is some learning rate, Ri : Ki → R is some regularization function, and BRi(·, ·) is the
Bregman divergence with respect to Ri defined as
BRi(ui, vi) = Ri(ui)−Ri(vi)− 〈∇Ri(vi), ui − vi〉
for ui, vi ∈ Ki. This gives rise to a family of update rules for different choices of the function Ri.
For example, it is well-known that by choosing Ri(ui) = ‖ui‖22/2, one recovers the gradient descent
algorithm, while by choosing Ri(ui) =
∑
s(ui,s lnui,s−ui,s), one recovers the multiplicative update
11The distributions of agents from different players are still different in general.
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algorithm. Using a similar argument as in [29], one can show that this algorithm, with a properly
chosen Ri, is indeed a no-regret algorithm for each agent of player i (see Appendix C for a proof
sketch), and this provides an incentive for the agents to use the algorithm. We need these Ri’s
(and BRi(·, ·)’s) to satisfy the following. The choices of Ri’s that satisfy this assumption will be
discussed in Section 3.2.2.
Assumption 3. For any i ∈ N and any xi, yi ∈ Ki,
‖xi − yi‖22 ≤ 2 · BRi(xi, yi).
Then the function Φ is “smooth” with respect to these Ri’s in the following sense by Definition 1
and Assumption 3.
Definition 2. We say that Φ is λ-smooth with respect to (R1, . . . , Rn) if for any two inputs x =
(x1, . . . , xn) and x
′ = (x′1, . . . , x′n) in K,
Φ(x′) ≤ Φ(x) + 〈∇Φ(x), x′ − x〉+ λ
n∑
i=1
BRi(x′i, xi). (7)
3.2 Convergence Results and Equilibria
Our main result in this section is the following, which shows that if each player (or agent of a
player) uses such an update algorithm, the system quickly converges, in the sense that the value of
the potential function Φ(xt) quickly approaches the minimum Φ(q), where q = arg minz∈K Φ(z).
Theorem 4. Consider any nonatomic congestion game of n players, with a potential function Φ
which is λ-smooth with respect to some (R1, . . . , Rn). Let q = (q1, . . . , qn) = arg minz∈K Φ(z). Now
suppose that each player i starts from some initial strategy x0i , with BRi(qi, x0i ) ≤ γ, and updates
her strategy according to the rule in (5), with ηi ∈ [η, 1/λ] for some η. Then for any ε ∈ (0, 1) there
exists some Tε ≤ nγ/(ηε) such that for any t ≥ Tε, Φ(xt) ≤ Φ(q) + ε.
We will prove this main result right after presenting its derived result. From Theorem 4, we
have the following, which we will prove in Section 3.2.2.
Corollary 5. Consider any nonatomic congestion game of n players with parameters given in
Section 2, and let λ = mbk. Now if each player i plays the gradient descent algorithm by starting
from any x0i ∈ Ki and using any ηi ∈ [η, 1/λ], then Tε ≤ 2/(nηε). Furthermore, if each player i
plays the multiplicative update algorithm by starting from a uniform x0i (same load on each allowed
path) and using any ηi ∈ [η, 1/λ], then Tε ≤ (n ln(dn))/(ηε).
Remark 1. According to Corollary 5, playing the gradient descent algorithm guarantees a faster
convergence time. In particular, if each player i uses ηi = 1/λ, then adopting the gradient descent
algorithm leads to a convergence time Tε ≤ 2mbk/(nε), while adopting the multiplicative update
algorithm leads to Tε ≤ (mbkn ln(dn))/ε.
Note that the given bound on Tε is proportional to γ by Theorem 4, which is an upper bound
on BRi(qi, x0i ). In Section 3.2.2 of Proof of Corollary 5, we can see that γ is smaller in the gradient
descent algorithm than in the multiplicative update algorithm. Thus, the corresponding different
bounds on Tε.
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Implications of Φ(xt) being close to Φ(q) include xt being an approximate equilibrium, which
will be proved in Section 3.2.3, and achieving social efficiency, which will be given in Section 3.3.
We say that a flow x ∈ K is an δ-equilibrium if for any player i ∈ N and any paths s, s′ ∈ Si with
xi,s > 0, cs(x) ≤ cs′(x) + δ. Note that with δ = 0, we recover the standard definition of equilibrium
for nonatomic games. The following shows that after the convergence time, the system playing our
algorithm will stay in an δ-equilibrium for a small δ.
Theorem 6. Any x ∈ K such that Φ(x) ≤ Φ(q) + ε for any ε must be a δ-equilibrium for some
δ ≤ √8bmε.
Analysis
To prove Theorem 4, the key observation is that the updates by all players collectively can be seen
as doing a generalized version of the mirror descent, with different step sizes in different dimensions,
on the potential function Φ defined in (1). To see this, note that for any i ∈ N and s ∈ Si, the s’th
entry of cˆti is
cs(x
t) =
∑
e∈s
ce(`e(x
t)) =
∂Φ(xt)
∂xi,s
,
which means that the d-dimensional vector (cˆti)i∈N is in fact equal to ∇Φ(xt), the gradient of Φ
at xt. That is, if we write ∇Φ(xt) = (∇1Φ(xt), . . . ,∇nΦ(xt)), with ∇iΦ(xt) being the portion of
∇Φ(xt) corresponding to player i, then the update rule of (5) and (6) becomes the following:
xt+1i = arg min
zi∈Ki
{
ηi〈∇iΦ(xt), zi〉+ BRi(zi, xti)
}
(8)
= arg min
zi∈Ki
BRi(zi, xti − ηi∇iΦ(xt)). (9)
Observe that when all the ηi’s are identical, the collective update of all players moves the whole
system exactly in the direction of −∇Φ(xt), and this becomes the standard mirror descent algorithm
which has the same step size across all dimensions. It is known that doing such a mirror descent on
a smooth convex function leads to a fast convergence to its minimum [9, 33]. On the other hand, we
consider the more general case in which different players can have different learning rates, and this
corresponds to a more general mirror descent algorithm which allows different step sizes in different
dimensions. Because the different step sizes have different scaling effects in different dimensions,
the collective update now no longer moves the whole system in the direction of −∇Φ(xt), and it
is not clear if a similar convergence result can be obtained. Interestingly, the following theorem
shows that doing such a generalized mirror descent algorithm on a general smooth convex function
still gives us a fast convergence to its minimum.
Theorem 7. Suppose K = K1 × · · · × Kn, with each Ki being a convex set. Let Φ : K → R be
any convex function which is λ-smooth with respect to some (R1, . . . , Rn) and let q = (q1, . . . , qn) =
arg minz∈K Φ(z). Suppose we start from some x0 = (x01, . . . , x0n), with each BRi(qi, x0i ) ≤ γ, and
then use the update rule in (8), with each ηi ∈ [η, 1/λ] for some η. Then for any ε ∈ (0, 1), there
exists some Tε ≤ nγ/(ηε) such that for any t ≥ Tε, Φ(xt) ≤ Φ(q) + ε.
We will prove Theorem 7 in Section 3.2.1. Now note that Theorem 4 follows immediately from
Theorem 7 since our potential function Φ is convex by Proposition 1. On the other hand, Theorem 7
works for a general convex function (not restricted to the specific potential function given in (1)),
which may have independent interest of its own.
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3.2.1 Proof of Theorem 7
Our proof follows closely that in [9] for the special case in which all the ηi’s are identical. To simplify
our notation, let us denote the gradient vector ∇Φ(xt) by gt = (gt1, . . . , gtn), with gti = ∇iΦ(xt).
Using the assumption that for each i, ηi ≤ 1/λ and thus λ ≤ 1/ηi, the λ-smoothness condi-
tion (7) implies that
Φ(xt+1) ≤ Φ(xt) + 〈gt, xt+1 − xt〉+
n∑
i=1
1
ηi
BRi(xt+1i , xti), (10)
because each BRi(xit+1, xit) is nonnegative. Then we need the following two lemmas, which we will
prove later.
Lemma 8. For any integer t ≥ 0, Φ(xt+1) ≤ Φ(xt).
Lemma 9. For any integer T ≥ 1,
T−1∑
t=0
(
Φ(xt+1)− Φ(q)) ≤ n∑
i=1
1
ηi
BRi(qi, x0i ).
Combining these two lemmas together, we obtain
T
(
Φ(xT )− Φ(q)) ≤ T−1∑
t=0
(
Φ(xt+1)− Φ(q))
≤
n∑
i=1
1
ηi
BRi(qi, x0i )
≤ nγ
η
.
Dividing both sides by T gives us
Φ(xT )− Φ(q) ≤ nγ
ηT
≤ ε,
when T ≥ nγ/(ηε), and we have the theorem. It remains to prove the two lemmas, which we do
next.
Proof of Lemma 8. We know from (10) that
Φ(xt+1) ≤ Φ(xt) +
n∑
i=1
(
〈gti , xt+1i − xti〉+
1
ηi
BRi(xt+1i , xti)
)
.
To bound the sum above, note that according to the definition of xt+1i in (8), we have
〈gti , xt+1i − xti〉+
1
ηi
BRi(xt+1i , xti)
≤ 〈gti , xti − xti〉+
1
ηi
BRi(xti, xti)
= 0.
Applying this to the above bound on Φ(xt+1), Lemma 8 follows.
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Proof of Lemma 9. We know from (10) that for any t ≥ 0, Φ(xt+1) is at most
Φ(xt) + 〈gt, xt+1 − xt〉+
n∑
i=1
1
ηi
BRi(xt+1i , xti),
where the second term above can be expressed as
〈gt, xt+1 − xt〉 = 〈gt, q − xt〉+ 〈gt, xt+1 − q〉
= 〈gt, q − xt〉+
n∑
i=1
〈gti , xt+1i − qi〉.
Since Φ(xt) + 〈gt, q − xt〉 ≤ Φ(q) for a convex Φ, we thus know that Φ(xt+1) is at most
Φ(q) +
n∑
i=1
(
〈gti , xt+1i − qi〉+
1
ηi
BRi(xt+1, xt)
)
. (11)
To bound the sum above, we rely on the following.
Proposition 10. For each i, 〈gti , xt+1i − qi〉 is at most
1
ηi
(BRi(qi, xti)− BRi(qi, xt+1i )− BRi(xt+1i , xti)) .
Proof. According to the definition of xt+1i in (8), it is also the minimizer of the function
L(z) = ηi〈gti , z − qi〉+ BRi(z, xti)
over z ∈ Ki, since 〈gti ,−qi〉 is a constant independent of z. Then from a well-known fact in convex
optimization [12, p.139-140], we know that
〈∇L(xt+1i ), qi − xt+1i 〉 ≥ 0.
Since ∇L(xt+1i ) = ηigti +∇Ri(xt+1i )−∇Ri(xti), we have
ηi〈gti , xt+1i − qi〉 ≤
〈∇Ri(xt+1i )−∇Ri(xti), qi − xt+1i 〉 . (12)
Then according to the definition of BRi(·), we have
BRi(qi, xti)
= Ri(qi)−Ri(xti)− 〈∇Ri(xti), qi − xti〉,
BRi(qi, xt+1i )
= Ri(qi)−Ri(xt+1i )− 〈∇Ri(xt+1i ), qi − xt+1i 〉, and
BRi(xt+1i , xti)
= Ri(x
t+1
i )−Ri(xti)− 〈∇Ri(xti), xt+1i − xti〉.
By subtracting the second and the third equalities from the first, we obtain
BRi(qi, xti)− BRi(qi, xt+1i )− BRi(xt+1i , xti)
=
〈∇Ri(xt+1i )−∇Ri(xti), qi − xt+1i 〉 .
Substituting this into (12) proves the proposition.
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Combining the bound from this proposition with the upper bound on Φ(xt+1) in (11), we obtain
Φ(xt+1) ≤ Φ(q) +
n∑
i=1
1
ηi
(BRi(qi, xti)− BRi(qi, xt+1i )) .
This implies that
T−1∑
t=0
(
Φ(xt+1)− Φ(q))
≤
n∑
i=1
1
ηi
T−1∑
t=0
(BRi(q, xti)− BRi(q, xt+1i ))
≤
n∑
i=1
1
ηi
BRi(qi, x0i ),
which proves Lemma 9.
3.2.2 Proof of Corollary 5
Let us first consider the case that each player plays the gradient descent algorithm. Note that
this corresponds to choosing Ri(ui) = ‖ui‖22/2 for each i, and one can show that BRi(ui, vi) =
‖ui − vi‖22/2, for ui, vi ∈ Ki. Then, we have
BRi(qi, x0i ) = ‖qi − x0i ‖22/2 ≤ ‖qi − x0i ‖21/2
which is at most (‖qi‖1 + ‖x0i ‖1)2 /2 ≤ 2/n2.
Therefore, we can choose γ = 2/n2 to have BRi(qi, x0i ) ≤ γ. Furthermore, using the Taylor
expansion together with Proposition 2, we know that for any x, x′ ∈ K,
Φ(x′) ≤ Φ(x) + 〈∇Φ(x), x′ − x〉+ λ‖x′ − x‖22/2,
with λ = mbk. Since
‖x′ − x‖22/2 =
∑
i
‖x′i − xi‖22/2 =
∑
i
BRi(x′i, xi),
we can guarantee that Φ is λ-smooth with this choice of Ri’s.
Next, let us consider the case that each player plays the multiplicative update algorithm. Note
that this corresponds to choosing Ri(ui) =
∑
s(ui,s lnui,s − ui,s) for each i, and one can show that
BRi(ui, vi) =
∑
s ui,s ln(ui,s/vi,s), for ui, vi ∈ Ki. Then, we have
BRi(qi, x0i ) ≤
∑
s
qi,s ln(|Si|n) ≤ ln(dn).
Therefore, we can choose γ = ln(dn) to have BRi(qi, x0i ) ≤ γ. Furthermore, we know that
‖x′i − xi‖22/2 ≤ ‖x′i − xi‖21/2 ≤ BRi(x′i, xi),
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by Pinsker’s inequality.12 Therefore, we can again guarantee that Φ is λ-smooth with this choice
of Ri’s.
Substituting these bounds of γ and λ into Theorem 4, Corollary 5 then follows.
3.2.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Consider any x ∈ K such that Φ(x) ≤ Φ(q) + ε and any i ∈ N . Let s0 be the path in Si which
minimizes cs(x) among s ∈ Si, and let s1 be the path which maximizes cs(x) among s ∈ Si with
xi,s > 0. Let δ = cs1(x)− cs0(x) and our goal is to show that δ is small by bounding it in terms of
ε. The idea is that if δ were large, we could move a significant amount of load from s1 to s0 and
decrease the Φ value substantially, which is impossible as Φ(x) is close to the minimum value Φ(q).
Formally, let us move some ∆ amount, which we will set later, of load from s1 to s0, and let
z denote the new flow. Note that the cost increase on s0 and the cost decrease on s1 are both at
most mb∆, since c′e(y) ≤ b for any y according to the condition (4). Thus, with ∆ = δ/(4bm) (since
δ = 4mb∆, i.e., the path cost difference can be expressed by multiplying the maximum number of
edges in a path, the upper bound on an edge cost changing rate, the amount of load moved, and
some proper constant scaling), we can have cs1(z) ≥ cs1(x)− δ/4 and cs0(z) ≤ cs0(x) + δ/4, so that
cs1(z)− cs0(z) ≥ cs1(x)− cs0(x)− δ/2 = δ/2, (13)
which can be used to bound the decrease of the Φ value.
Moving the load decreases the Φ value by the amount
Φ(x)− Φ(z)
=
∑
e∈s1\s0
∫ `e(x)
`e(x)−∆
ce(y)dy −
∑
e∈s0\s1
∫ `e(x)+∆
`e(x)
ce(y)dy
≥
∑
e∈s1\s0
∆ce(`e(x)−∆)−
∑
e∈s0\s1
∆ce(`e(x) + ∆)
= ∆
∑
e∈s1
ce(`e(z))−∆
∑
e∈s0
ce(`e(z))
= ∆ (cs1(z)− cs0(z))
≥ ∆δ/2,
where the first inequality holds as the function ce is nondecreasing and the last inequality holds by
(13). Since z is still a feasible flow in K, its Φ value cannot be smaller than that of q and we must
have Φ(x) − Φ(z) ≤ Φ(x) − Φ(q) ≤ ε, which implies that ∆δ/2 ≤ ε. With ∆ = δ/(4bm), we have
δ ≤ √8bmε (and ∆ ≤√ ε2bm). Since this holds for any i ∈ N , we have the theorem.
3.3 Social Costs
According to Theorem 4, the flow xt at step t ≥ Tε enjoys the nice property that Φ(xt) ≤ Φ(q) + ε.
In this section, we show the implication of this property on the social costs.
12Pinsker’s inequality states that the total variance is upper bounded by the KL-divergence between two probability
distributions where the total variance can be defined as half the 1-norm between these two distributions. The Bregman
divergence is KL-divergence here.
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3.3.1 Average Individual Cost
We show that after the convergence time, the average individual cost achieved by our algorithm is
only within a constant factor from the optimum one.
Theorem 11. Any x ∈ K such that Φ(x) ≤ Φ(q) + ε must have CA(x)CA(x∗) ≤
b
a
(
1 + 2mεa
)
.
Proof. For any z ∈ K, we can rewrite CA(z) as
CA(z) =
∑
e
`e(z)ce(`e(z))
=
∑
e
∫ `e(z)
0
(yce(y))
′ dy
=
∑
e
∫ `e(z)
0
(
ce(y) + yc
′
e(y)
)
dy.
Under the condition (4), we have yc′e(y) ≤ yb = bab0y ≤ bace(y) and thus
CA(z) ≤
∑
e
∫ `e(z)
0
(
1 +
b
b0
)
ce(y)dy
=
a+ b
a
Φ(z). (14)
On the other hand, we also have yc′e(y) ≥ yb0 = ab by ≥ ab ce(y) and thus
CA(z) ≥
∑
e
∫ `e(z)
0
(
1 +
a
b
)
ce(y)dy
=
a+ b
b
Φ(z). (15)
Replacing z in (14) by x with Φ(x) ≤ Φ(q) + ε, and replacing z in (15) by x∗, we obtain
CA(x)
CA(x∗)
≤ b
a
Φ(x)
Φ(x∗)
≤ b
a
Φ(q) + ε
Φ(q)
,
as Φ(x∗) ≥ Φ(q), which gives us
CA(x)
CA(x∗)
≤ b
a
(
1 +
ε
Φ(q)
)
. (16)
Finally, using the condition (4), we have for any z ∈ K that
Φ(z) ≥
∑
e
∫ `e(z)
0
aydy =
a
2
∑
e
(`e(z))
2
≥ a
2m
(∑
e
`e(z)
)2
≥ a
2m
, (17)
where the second inequality is by Cauchy-Schwarz and the last inequality holds as the total load
of players is 1. Substituting the bound of (17) into (16) with z = q, we have the theorem.
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Remark 2. We can make CA(x)CA(x∗) ≤
b
a (1 + σ) for any σ we want, by choosing ε = aσ/(2m). Then
by Remark 1, one can compute the corresponding convergence time Tε, which is proportional to
1/σ.
3.3.2 Maximum Individual Cost in Symmetric Games
In a symmetric game, Si = S for every i ∈ N . Taking advantage of this property, we show that
after the convergence time the maximum individual cost achieved by our algorithm is again within
a constant factor from the optimum one.
Theorem 12. Any x ∈ K such that Φ(x) ≤ Φ(q) + ε must have CM (x)CM (xˆ) ≤
b
a
(
1 + 2mεa +
δm
b
)
, where
δ ≤ √8bmε.
Proof. Consider any x ∈ K with Φ(x) ≤ Φ(q)+ε. Let s0 = arg mins∈S cs(x) and s1 = arg maxs∈S cs(x).
To apply Theorem 6, let us choose a player i with xi,s1 > 0; such a player must exist because other-
wise there would be no load on s1 and cs1(x) = 0 could not be the highest path cost. Since Si = S
in a symmetric game, s0 is also the path of player i with the lowest path cost. Therefore, we can
apply Theorem 6 and have δ = cs1(x)− cs0(x) ≤
√
8bmε. Note that CM (x) = cs1(x) by definition.
Thus, we have
CM (x)
CM (xˆ)
≤ cs1(x)
CA(xˆ)
=
cs0(x) + δ
CA(xˆ)
≤ CA(x) + δ
CA(x∗)
,
where the first inequality is by the definitions of CM and CA, and the second inequality follows
from the fact that cs0(x) ≤ CA(x) and x∗ minimizes CA. Furthermore,
CA(x) + δ
CA(x∗)
=
CA(x)
CA(x∗)
+
δ
CA(x∗)
≤ b
a
(
1 +
2εm
a
)
+
δ
CA(x∗)
by Theorem 11. Finally, using a similar analysis as in the proof of Theorem 11, one can show that
CA(x
∗) ≥
∑
e
∫ `e(x∗)
0
(ay + ay)dy = a
∑
e
(`e(x
∗))2 ≥ a
m
.
Combining all the bounds together, we have the theorem.
Remark 3. We can make CM (x)CM (xˆ) ≤
b
a(1 + σ) for any σ we want, by choosing ε = aσ
2/(32m).
Then according to Remark 1, one can compute the corresponding convergence time Tε, which is
now proportional to 1/σ2.
4 The Bandit Model
We consider the setting in which the players play the congestion game iteratively in the following
way. In step t, each player i plays some strategy xti by sampling a path si ∈ Si with probability
piti,si = x
t
i,si
n and sending her entire flow of amount 1/n through that path si. After that, she gets
to know the cost of that path, which is
csi(X
t) =
∑
e∈si
ce(`e(X
t)),
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where Xt is the choice vector of the players in step t. With this feedback, she updates her next
strategy xt+1i in some way and then proceeds to the next step. Let us stress that the only information
a player has access to in a step is the cost of the path she has just chosen, and she has no information
about that of any other path she has not chosen. This is known as the bandit model in the area of
online learning [34, Chapter 4][3, 24]. It is a more challenging model compared to the bulletin-board
model considered in [29] and in Section 3, in which each player i can learn the costs of all her
allowed (even unchosen) paths.
We consider the same function for the convergence purpose:
Φ(x) =
∑
e∈E
∫ `e(x)
0
ce(y)dy, (18)
for x ∈ K, where
`e(x) =
∑
j∈N
∑
r∈Sj :e∈r
xtj,r,
with `(·) being the same function defined in (3). According to Proposition 1, Φ is a convex function.
We still assume that the cost functions satisfy the property in (4).
Note that this function Φ was used in Section 3 for a nonatomic version of the congestion game,
with its input corresponding to splittable flows of players, and its minimizer corresponding to a
pure Nash equilibrium with infinitely many agents (i.e., a Wardrop equilibrium). As we consider
the atomic version of the congestion game, we now interpret its input as the mixed strategies of
players. However, its minimizer corresponds no longer to a pure or mixed Nash equilibrium, but
instead to an approximate Nash equilibrium, to be discussed later. We will rely on the following
proposition, whose proof we omit here as it follows easily from an analysis in [29, Proof of Lemma 8]
using Taylor expansion. The proposition intuitively means that the difference between the expected
cost and the cost of expected flow (proportional to the probability distribution of mixed strategies)
on s is bounded.
Proposition 13. Let x ∈ K and X the choice vector sampled according to x. Then for any
s, 0 ≤ E [cs(X)] − cs(x) ≤ Bm8n where B is the bound on the second derivative of cost functions
(Section 2). This implies that classes of cost functions with smaller B give better bounds on the
difference. In particular, with linear cost functions where B = 0, then E [cs(X)] = cs(x) for any s.
4.1 Bandit Algorithms
We would like to follow the approach of Section 3.1 which showed that when each player plays
a mirror-descent algorithm with her own learning rate, the joint strategy profile of the players
converges quickly. However, there are two key differences in our setting which prevent us from
applying their result directly. The first is that here we consider the atomic version of the congestion
game, in which each player must send her entire flow on one single path, unlike the non-atomic
version considered in Section 3 in which a player can split her flow across multiple paths in each
step. The second difference is that the feedback model considered in Section 3 is the easier bulletin
model, in which each player, after sending her flow in a step, gets to see all the costs of her allowed
paths. That is, in step t, player i is able to learn the cost
cs(x
t) =
∑
e∈s
ce(`e(x
t)), with `e(x) =
∑
j∈N
∑
r∈Sj :e∈r
xtj,r,
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for every s ∈ Si, where xt is the joint strategy profile of players, describing how each player splits
her flow. It was shown in Section 3.1 that for any i ∈ N and s ∈ Si,
cs(x
t) =
∑
e∈s
ce(`e(x
t)) =
∂Φ(xt)
∂xi,s
, (19)
which means that each player i gets to know the part of the gradient vector ∇Φ(xt) related to her,
denoted as ∇iΦ(xt), consisting of ∂Φ(x
t)
∂xi,s
for s ∈ Si. This allows each player to update her strategy
in a way that the whole system of players can be seen as collectively running a generalized mirror-
descent algorithm on the convex potential function Φ. However, in the more challenging bandit
model we adopt in this paper, each player i does not know the whole vector ∇iΦ(xt). Instead, the
only information player i has after choosing a path si is
csi(X
t) =
∑
e∈si
ce(`e(X
t)), with `e(X
t) =
∑
j∈N
∑
r∈Sj :e∈r
Xtj,r,
where Xt is the choice vector of players at step t. Note that not only does each player i receive
less information (one value instead of |Si| values), the information csi(Xt) she receives actually is
different from the more useful value csi(x
t) that corresponds to an entry in ∇Φ(xt).
In order to follow the framework in Section 3, each player i needs to have a way to approximate
the vector ∇iΦ(xt), her portion of the gradient vector ∇Φ(xt). Our basic idea is for each player
to divide the time steps into episodes, each consisting of a consecutive number of steps, and to do
the following in each episode. During episode τ , each player i plays some fixed strategy xτi for all
the steps (instead of playing different strategies in different steps), collects statistics to obtain an
estimate gˆτi for ∇iΦ(xτ ), and at the end of the episode uses gˆτi to update her strategy for the next
episode. Two keys are: how to come up with the estimate gˆτi and how to update the next strategy,
which we describe next.
4.1.1 Updating the Strategies
With a “good” estimate gˆτi that we will define and show how to achieve in Section 4.1.2, we can
follow Section 3.1 and consider the following update rule for each player i’s strategy of the next
episode:
xτ+1i = arg min
zi∈K¯i
{
ηi〈gˆτi , zi〉+ BRi(zi, xτi )
}
(20)
Here, ηi > 0 is some learning rate, Ri : K¯i → R is some regularization function, and BRi(·, ·) is the
Bregman divergence with respect to Ri defined as
BRi(ui, vi) = Ri(ui)−Ri(vi)− 〈∇Ri(vi), ui − vi〉
for ui, vi ∈ K¯i. This gives rise to a family of update rules for different choices of Ri. For example,
it is known that by choosing Ri(ui) = ‖ui‖22/2 to have BRi(xi, yi) = ‖xi − yi‖22/2, one recovers the
gradient descent algorithm, while by choosing Ri(ui) =
∑
s(ui,s lnui,s − ui,s) to have BRi(xi, yi) =∑
s xi,s ln(xi,s/yi,s), one recovers the multiplicative updates algorithm. In the bandit atomic model,
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(with a properly chosen Ri) we may need the number of players n to be large to have low regret
13
for each player in order to provide an incentive for the players to use the algorithm. We will need
these Ri’s with BRi(·, ·)’s to satisfy the following, which is a bit stricter than Assumption 3.
Assumption 14. There is some parameter Γ such that for any i ∈ N and any xi, yi ∈ K¯i,
Γ · BRi(xi, yi) ≤ ‖xi − yi‖22 ≤ 2 · BRi(xi, yi).
Note that the parameter Γ in the assumption is determined by the choice of Ri as well as the
set K¯i, which is a subset (defined in Section 4.1.2) of Ki and in turn depends on the parameter
Λ introduced in Section 4.1.2. It is clear that for Ri(ui) = ‖ui‖22/2 and BRi(xi, yi) = ‖xi −
yi‖22/2, the assumption holds with Γ = 2. For Ri(xi) =
∑
s(xi,s lnxi,s − xi,s) and BRi(xi, yi) =∑
s xi,s ln(xi,s/yi,s), the following shows that the assumption holds with Γ = Λ/n, which we prove
in Appendix D.
Proposition 15. With BRi(xi, yi) =
∑
s xi,s ln(xi,s/yi,s), it holds that for any xi, yi ∈ K¯i,
Λ
n
· BRi(xi, yi) ≤ ‖xi − yi‖22 ≤ 2 · BRi(xi, yi).
Let us remark that we use the L2 norm ‖ · ‖2 in the assumption, instead of a general norm,
for the purpose of simplifying our presentation in the next section; one can check that our analysis
there also works for a general norm, but the bounds derived would be more complicated.
4.1.2 Approximating the Gradient
Now, we define and show how to guarantee a good estimate gˆτi . Consider any episode τ and player
i. For each path s ∈ Si, she computes the average cost of that path during the episode as the
corresponding entry in gˆτi . That is, if we let gˆ
τ
i,s denote the s’th entry in gˆ
τ
i and let T τi,s denote the
set of steps in episode τ that player i chose path s, then
gˆτi,s =
1
|T τi,s|
∑
t∈T τi,s
cs(X
t), (21)
which we would like to be a good approximation of cs(x
τ ). This requires |T τi,s| to be large enough
which in turns needs piτi,s, or equivalently x
τ
i,s, to be large enough. To guarantee this, we restrict each
player i to play strategies in a smaller feasible set K¯i ⊆ Ki, such that for any xi ∈ K¯i, xi,s ≥ Λ(1/n),
for some parameter Λ, which implies that each path s is chosen with probability pii,s ≥ Λ. One way
of choosing such K¯i is for each yi ∈ Ki to include a corresponding xi with xi,s = (1−Λ)yi,s+Λ(1/n),
for each s. In this way, one can have the guarantee that every yi ∈ Ki has some xi ∈ K¯i such that
‖xi − yi‖1 ≤ dΛ(1/n). We sum up the procedure for approximating the gradient in the following.
Then by setting the number of steps in each episode τ to
νn2 log(ndτ)
Λm2
,
for a large enough constant ν, we have the following.
13Later in Section 4.2.2, it will be clear that since our goal is to make the convergence close to the minimizer
(considering the approximation error of the gradient), the learning rate bound η there is set dependent on n in a way
such that η is smaller when n is larger. This in turn affects that n has to be large enough to make the dominant
term, which is proportional to η, in the regret small enough.
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Algorithm 1 Procedure for approximating the gradient
1: for each yi ∈ Ki include a corresponding xi ∈ K¯i with xi,s = (1− Λ)yi,s + Λ(1/n), for each s.
2: for any episode τ and player i do
3: for each path s ∈ Si do
4: Compute gˆτi,s =
1
|T τi,s|
∑
t∈T τi,s cs(X
t).
5: end for
6: end for
Lemma 16. With high probability of at least 1−2κ for a small enough constant κ chosen arbitrarily,
each player i in each episode τ can have
‖gˆτi −∇iΦ(xτ )‖∞ ≤
4bm
n
.
Proof. Fix any player i, path s ∈ Si, and episode τ . Our goal is to show that
∣∣gˆτi,s −∇i,sΦ(xτ )∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1|T τi,s|
∑
t∈T τi,s
(
cs(X
t)− cs(xτ )
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ (22)
is small with high probability. We would like to show that cs(X
t) has expected value E[cs(X
t)]
close to cs(x
τ ) so that we can apply a Hoeffding bound on (22), but there is a subtlety here that
we need to be careful about. Note that for a given t, although the expected value of Xt equals xτ
when there is no additional conditioning, this is no longer true under the condition that t ∈ T τi,s,
as player i’s choice does not remain random but is fixed to s according to the definition of T τi,s.
Let us consider a related random variable Xˆt, which is similar to Xt but with player i’s choice
left random, sampled according to xτi . Then it has the nice property that E[Xˆ
t] = xτ , so that
E[`e(Xˆ
t)] = `e(x
τ ) for any e and hence∣∣∣E [cs(Xˆt)]− cs(xτ )∣∣∣ ≤ Bm
8n
, (23)
for any s by Proposition 13. In addition, it has costs close to those associated with Xt, as by
Taylor’s expansion on ce(`e(X
t)) at `e(Xˆ
t), |ce(`e(Xt))− ce(`e(Xˆt))| is at most
b
∣∣∣`e(Xt)− `e(Xˆt)∣∣∣+ b
2
∣∣∣`e(Xt)− `e(Xˆt)∣∣∣2 ≤ b
n
+
b
2n2
≤ 2b
n
for any e, which implies that ∣∣∣cs(Xt)− cs(Xˆt)∣∣∣ ≤∑
e∈s
2b
n
≤ 2bm
n
(24)
for any s. From the bounds in (24) and (23), we have∣∣E [cs(Xt)]− cs(xτ )∣∣
≤
∣∣∣E [cs(Xˆt)]− cs(xτ )∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣E [cs(Xt)]− E [cs(Xˆt)]∣∣∣
≤ Bm
8n
+
2bm
n
≤ 3bm
n
. (25)
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With this, we can then apply the Hoeffding bound to get
Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1|T τi,s|
∑
t∈T τi,s
(
cs(X
t)− cs(xτ )
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 4bmn
 ≤ κ
ndτ2
for some small enough constant κ, whenever |T τi,s| ≥ wτ where wτ = νn
2 log(ndτ)
2m2
for a large enough
constant ν. Let us define the following good event
• G: |T τi,s| ≥ wτ for every τ, i, s.
Recall that each episode τ consists of 2w
τ
Λ steps. Thus, for any τ, i, s,
E
[|T τi,s|] ≥ Λ2wτΛ = 2wτ
and a union bound together with a Hoeffding bound give us
Pr [¬G] ≤
∑
τ,i,s
Pr
[|T τi,s| < wτ ] ≤∑
τ,i,s
κ
2ndτ2
≤ κ.
As a result, we have
Pr
[
∃τ, i, s : ∣∣gˆτi,s −∇i,sΦ(xτ )∣∣ > 4bmn
]
≤
∑
τ,i,s
Pr
[∣∣gˆτi,s −∇i,sΦ(xτ )∣∣ > 4bmn | G
]
+ Pr [¬G]
≤
∑
τ,i,s
κ
2ndτ2
+ κ
≤ 2κ,
for a small enough constant κ, which proves the lemma.
4.2 Convergence Results
In this section, we analyze the behavior of the system of players adopting the algorithm described in
Section 4.1. Our main result is the following, which shows that the system indeed quickly converges,
in the sense that the value of the potential function Φ(xτ ) quickly comes near the minimum value
Φ(q), where q = arg minz∈K Φ(z), and then stays close afterwards.
Theorem 17. Consider any atomic congestion game of n players, with a potential function Φ
which is (α, β, λ)-smooth, and let q = arg minz∈K Φ(z). Suppose each player i updates her strategy
according to the rule in (5), with ηi ≤ 1/λ, using gˆτi described in (21) with the guarantee that
‖gˆτi −∇iΦ(xτ )‖∞ ≤ . (26)
Consider any η such that η ≤ ηi for any i and θ =
√
ηΓn ≤ 1, and let δ = 6 + θβdΛ, where Γ
is the parameter in Assumption 14 and Λ is the parameter introduced in Section 4.1.2. Then for
τ0 = α/δ and 4 = 3δ/θ, it holds that for any τ ≥ τ0,
Φ(xτ ) ≤ Φ(q) +4
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or equivalently,
Φ(xτ ) ≤ Φ(q) + 3(6
√

ηΓn
+ βdΛ).
As in Section 3.1, we consider two examples of setting the choices in the following, which will
be proved in Section 4.2.2.
Corollary 18. Consider any atomic congestion game of n players with parameters given in Sec-
tion 2. If each player i plays the gradient descent algorithm over K¯i with ηi ≤ 1/λ, then with high
probability,
4 = O
(
k1/2m
n
)
and T0 = O
(
n4d log(nd)
m2k1/2
)
.
Furthermore, if each player i plays the multiplicative updates algorithm over K¯i with ηi ≤ 1/λ, then
with high probability,
4 = O
((
kd
n
)1/3
m
)
and T0 = O
(
n10/3d2/3 log(nd)
m2k1/3
)
.
From the corollary, we see that playing the gradient descent algorithm guarantees a smaller
error 4, as k ≤ d. Take for example the load balancing game studied in [29], which has d = n
and k = m = 1. The gradient-descent algorithm can achieve 4 = O(1/n), while the multiplicative
updates algorithm only has 4 = O(1). Although the convergence time T0 of the gradient-descent
algorithm may look higher in the the corollary, one can in fact make it smaller by choosing a
smaller Λ (with a slightly increased 4), so that both of its T0 and 4 are smaller than those of
the multiplicative updates algorithm. Note that to have a small error, both algorithms need n,
the number of players, to be large. This seems unavoidable in the bandit model considered here,
because the amount of flow each player has is as large as 1/n, which limits the accuracy each player
can have on the estimations of the path costs and gradient vectors.
Implication of the convergence, including approximate equilibria and guarantees regarding social
costs, will be discussed in Section 4.3.
Analysis
The proof of the theorem is based on the idea of Section 3.1 that if each player i can actually have
her portion ∇iΦ(xτ ) of the gradient vector ∇Φ(xτ ) and do the update
xτ+1i = arg min
zi∈Ki
{
ηi〈∇iΦ(xτ ), zi〉+ BRi(zi, xτi )
}
,
then the collective update of all players can be seen as doing some generalized mirror descent on
the convex function Φ. Then it was shown in Section 3.1 that doing such a mirror descent on
any convex function will lead to a quick convergence. However, in our setting, each player can
only obtain an estimate gˆτi of the desired vector ∇iΦ(xτ ), which only allows players collectively to
perform an “approximate” mirror descent on the convex function. Unfortunately, the convergence
analysis of Section 3.1 relies on showing that Φ(xτ+1) ≤ Φ(xτ ) for every τ , which depends crucially
on being able to move (in the mirror space) precisely in the opposite direction of the gradient
vector. As we now can no longer move in that precise direction, the next Φ value may increase, and
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it is not clear if convergence can still be guaranteed. Interestingly, we provide a positive answer,
with the following theorem. In fact it works for any general convex function Φ, which is smooth in
the sense of Definition 1.
Theorem 19. Let Φ : K → R be any (α, β, λ)-smooth convex function, with q = arg minz∈K Φ(z),
where K = K1 × · · · × Kn, such that ‖x − y‖1 ≤ 2 for any x, y ∈ K. Suppose for each i, we have
a convex K¯i ⊆ Ki with the property that any x ∈ K has some y ∈ K¯ = K¯1 × · · · × K¯n such that
‖x − y‖1 ≤ dΛ, and suppose moreover that we have Ri’s satisfying Assumption 14 so Γ is the
parameter therein. Now consider the update rule in (5), with each ηi ≤ 1/λ, using gˆτi such that
‖gˆτi −∇Φi(xτ )‖∞ ≤ .
Consider any η such that η ≤ ηi for any i and θ =
√
ηΓn ≤ 1, and let δ = 6 + θβdΛ. Then for
τ0 = α/δ and 4 = 3δ/θ, it holds that for any τ ≥ τ0,
Φ(xτ ) ≤ Φ(q) +4
or equivalently,
Φ(xτ ) ≤ Φ(q) + 3(6
√

ηΓn
+ βdΛ).
Note that Theorem 17 follows immediately from Theorem 19. This is because our function
Φ is convex and furthermore, any x ∈ K has some y ∈ K¯ with ‖x − y‖1 =
∑
i ‖xi − yi‖1 ≤∑
i dΛ(1/n) = dΛ. On the other hand, Theorem 7 works for a general convex function, which may
have independent interest of its own. To prove Theorem 19, we rely on the following key lemma.
Lemma 20. Let θ =
√
ηΓn and δ = 6 + θβdΛ. Then given the assumption of Theorem 19, we
have
Φ(xτ+1) ≤ Φ(xτ )− θ (Φ(xτ )− Φ(q)) + δ,
for any integer τ ≥ 0. This means that
Φ(xτ+1) ≤ Φ(xτ )− δ
whenever Φ(xτ )− Φ(q) ≥ 2δ/θ.
This lemma helps us deal with the difficulty we discussed before. That is, although doing mirror
descent using the exact gradient vector can guarantee a decreased Φ value, as shown in Section 3.1,
this may no longer hold in general when using an approximate gradient vector. Nevertheless,
Lemma 20 shows that as long as the current Φ value has a large enough gap from the minimum
one, doing mirror descent using an approximate gradient vector can still guarantee a decreased Φ
value. We will prove the lemma in Section 4.2.1. Assuming the lemma, now we proceed to prove
Theorem 19.
Proof of Theorem 19. From Lemma 20, we know that as long as Φ(xτ ) − Φ(q) ≥ 2δ/θ, the next
Φ(xτ+1) will decrease from Φ(xτ ) by at least the amount δ. Since Φ(x) ≤ α for any x ∈ K,
according to the smoothness assumption, and Φ(q) ≥ 0, we know that there must be some episode
τ1 ≤ τ0 = α/δ such that Φ(xτ1) − Φ(q) < 2δ/θ. After that, the value of Φ may again exceed the
threshold Φ(q) + 2δ/θ, but we next argue that it cannot go much higher than that.
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Let τ2 denote the episode after τ1 such that Φ(x
τ2) reaches the highest value. Then Φ(xτ2)
much have just been increased from its previous episode with a smaller Φ value, which can only
happen when
Φ(xτ2−1)− Φ(q) ≤ 2δ/θ.
On the other hand, we know from Lemma 20 that
Φ(xτ2) ≤ Φ(xτ2−1) + δ.
Consequently, for any τ ≥ τ0 ≥ τ1, we must have
Φ(xτ ) ≤ Φ(xτ2) ≤ Φ(q) + 2δ/θ + δ ≤ Φ(q) + 3δ/θ,
which completes the proof of Theorem 19.
4.2.1 Proof of Lemma 20
To simplify our notation, let us denote the gradient vector ∇Φ(xτ ) by gτ = (gτ1 , . . . , gτn), with
gτi = ∇iΦ(xτ ). Then from the assumption that Φ is (α, β, λ)-smooth, we have
Φ(xτ+1) ≤ Φ(xτ ) + 〈gτ , xτ+1 − xτ 〉+ λ
2
‖xτ+1 − xτ‖22,
with the right-hand side above being
Φ(xτ ) +
∑
i∈N
(
〈gτi , xτ+1i − xτi 〉+
λ
2
‖xτ+1i − xτi ‖22
)
≤ Φ(xτ ) +
∑
i∈N
(
〈gτi , xτ+1i − xτi 〉+
1
ηi
BRi(xτ+1i , xτi )
)
,
according to Assumption 14 together with the assumption that ηi ≤ 1/λ and hence λ ≤ 1/ηi, as
well as the fact that BRi(xτ+1, xτ ) is nonnegative. To bound the sum above, let us first change
〈gτi , xτ+1i − xτi 〉 into
〈gˆτi , xτ+1i − xτi 〉+ 〈gτi − gˆτi , xτ+1i − xτi 〉,
so that each
〈gτi , xτ+1i − xτi 〉+
1
ηi
BRi(xτ+1i , xτi )
now becomes
〈gˆτi , xτ+1i − xτi 〉+
1
ηi
BRi(xτ+1i , xτi ) + 〈gτi − gˆτi , xτ+1i − xτi 〉.
The sum of the first two terms above according to the definition of xτ+1i in (5) is at most
〈gˆτi , zi − xτi 〉+
1
ηi
BRi(zi, xτi ),
for any zi ∈ K¯i, while the last term above by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality is at most
‖gτi − gˆτi ‖∞‖xτ+1i − xτi ‖1 ≤ ‖xτ+1i − xτi ‖1,
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according to the assumption that ‖gτi − gˆτi ‖∞ ≤ . Since∑
i∈N
‖xτ+1i − xτi ‖1 = ‖xτ+1 − xτ‖1 ≤ 2
from the assumption of the lemma, we have∑
i∈N
(
〈gτi , xτ+1i − xτi 〉+
1
ηi
BRi(xτ+1i , xτi )
)
≤
∑
i∈N
〈gˆτi , zi − xτi 〉+
1
η
∑
i∈N
BRi(zi, xτi ) + 2, (27)
for any zi ∈ K¯i.
Our goal then is to choose these zi’s to make the above small enough. Our idea is to take
z = (z1, . . . , zn) as a point that moves from x
τ towards
q¯ = (q¯1, . . . , q¯n) = arg min
x∈K¯
Φ(x).
That is, we consider
zi = x
τ
i + θ(q¯i − xτi ),
for some parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] to be determined later. Note that zi does belong to K¯i because it is a
convex combination of xτi and q¯i, both of which are in the convex set K¯i. With zi−xτi = θ(q¯i−xτi ),
we are now able to relate the bound in (27) to Φ(xτ )− Φ(q¯) because the first term there is∑
i∈N
〈gˆτi , zi − xτi 〉
=
∑
i∈N
〈gτi , zi − xτi 〉+
∑
i∈N
〈gˆτi − gτi , zi − xτi 〉
= θ
∑
i∈N
〈gτi , q¯i − xτi 〉+ θ
∑
i∈N
〈gˆτi − gτi , q¯i − xτi 〉, (28)
where the first term in (28) is
θ〈gτ , q¯ − xτ 〉 ≤ −θ (Φ(xτ )− Φ(q¯))
by the convexity of Φ, while the second term in (28) by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality is at most
θ
∑
i∈N
‖gˆτi − gτi ‖∞‖zi − xτi ‖1 ≤ θ‖z − xτ‖1 ≤ 2,
as ‖z − xτ‖1 ≤ 2 and θ ≤ 1. It remains to bound the second term in (27). Note that according to
Assumption 14,
BRi(zi, xτi ) ≤
1
Γ
‖zi − xτi ‖22 =
θ2
Γ
‖q¯i − xτi ‖22,
where
‖q¯i − xτi ‖22 =
∑
s
(
q¯i,s − xτi,s
)2 ≤∑
s
1
n
∣∣q¯i,s − xτi,s∣∣ ,
28
since q¯i,s, x
τ
i,s ∈ [0, 1n ] for every s. This means that
1
η
∑
i∈N
BRi(zi, xτi ) ≤
θ2
ηΓn
‖xτ − q¯‖1 ≤ 2θ
2
ηΓn
.
By plugging these bounds into (27), we have∑
i∈N
(
〈gτi , xτ+1i − xτi 〉+
1
ηi
BRi(xτ+1i , xτi )
)
≤ −θ (Φ(xτ )− Φ(q¯)) + 2+ 2θ
2
ηΓn
+ 2,
which then implies that
Φ(xτ+1) ≤ Φ(xτ )− θ (Φ(xτ )− Φ(q¯)) + 2θ
2
ηΓn
+ 4, (29)
for any θ ∈ [0, 1].
The bound in (29) is still not satisfactory as it involves q¯ instead of q. To relate Φ(q¯) to Φ(q),
note that according to the assumption, there exists some q′ ∈ K¯ such that ‖q− q′‖1 ≤ dΛ, while as
q¯ minimizes Φ over K¯, we have
Φ(q¯) ≤ Φ(q′) ≤ Φ(q) + 〈∇Φ(q′), q′ − q〉
by the convexity of Φ. Then, by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
Φ(q¯) ≤ Φ(q) + ‖∇Φ(q′)‖∞‖q′ − q‖1 ≤ Φ(q) + βdΛ,
as ‖∇Φ(q′)‖∞ ≤ β by the smoothness assumption on Φ. Finally, by substituting this into (29), we
have
Φ(xτ+1) ≤ Φ(xτ )− θ (Φ(xτ )− Φ(q)) + 2θ
2
ηΓn
+ 4+ θβdΛ.
Now let us choose θ =
√
ηΓn, and note that θ ≤ 1 by the assumption on η. With this choice
of θ, we obtain
Φ(xτ+1) ≤ Φ(xτ )− θ (Φ(xτ )− Φ(q)) + δ,
where
δ = 6+ θβdΛ.
This implies that Φ(xτ+1) ≤ Φ(xτ )− δ whenever Φ(xτ )− Φ(q) ≥ 2δ/θ, which completes the proof
of Lemma 20.
4.2.2 Proof of Corollary 18
Note that the bounds in the theorem depend on the parameters Γ and Λ. In fact, we have the
freedom to choose the parameter Λ as well as the functions Ri(·)’s, while the parameter Γ is then
determined by them.
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The first is to choose Ri(xi) = ‖xi‖22/2 to have BRi(xi, yi) = ‖xi − yi‖22/2. In this case, each
player’s algorithm becomes the gradient-descent algorithm, and we can choose
Γ = 2 and Λ =
√

2ηn
1
βd
,
which gives us
4 = 21
√

2ηn
and τ0 =
α
7
.
The second example is to chooseRi(xi) =
∑
s(xi,s lnxi,s−xi,s) to have BRi(xi, yi) =
∑
s xi,s ln(xi,s/yi,s).
In this case, each player’s algorithm becomes the multiplicative updates algorithm, and according
to Proposition 15 we can choose
Γ =
Λ
n
and Λ =
(

ηβ2d2
)1/3
,
which gives us
4 = 21
(
βd
η
)1/3
and τ0 =
α
7
.
Although we stated above the convergence bounds in terms of the number of episodes, by incor-
porating the sizes of the episodes, it follows that the number of steps needed for convergence is at
most
T0 =
νn2 log(ndτ0)
Λm2
· τ0.
Finally, let us go back to the congestion game and substitute the parameters α = bm/2, β =
bm, λ = bmk from Proposition 2 into the bounds above. Let us set the parameter  = 4bm/n
according to Lemma 16 so that (26) holds for every player and episode with high probability.
Moreover, let us assume for simplicity that ηi ≥ Ω(1/λ) so that we have η ≥ Ω(1/λ). Then we have
the corollary.
4.3 Equilibria and Social Costs
Now we briefly discuss the implication of the guarantee Φ(xτ ) ≤ Φ(q) + 4 given by the results
in Section 4.2. The first is that such an piτ is an approximate equilibrium in mixed strategies,
where we say that pi is a δ-equilibrium if for any player i ∈ N and any paths s, s′ ∈ Si with
xi,s > 0, E[cs(X)] ≤ E[cs′(X)] + δ, where X is the choice vector sampled according to x and
xi =
1
npii for any i.
14 To show this, note that we know from Section 3.2.3 that any xτ satisfying
the condition Φ(xτ ) ≤ Φ(q) +4 must have cs(xτ ) ≤ cs′(xτ ) +
√
8bm4. This and Proposition 13
14There is an alternative way to define an approximate equilibrium. Let (yi(t), X−i) denote a vector where with no
randomness yi(t) is a vector with
1
n
in dimension t and all 0’s in the rest and still with randomness X−i is the choice
vector sampled according to x without dimension i and xi =
1
n
pii for any i. If pi is a δ-equilibrium if for any player i ∈ N
and any paths s, s′ ∈ Si with xi,s > 0, E[cs(yi(s), X−i)] ≤ E[cs′(yi(s′), X−i)] + δ, where (yi(s), X−i), (yi(s′), X−i)
are defined above. We then have that E[cs(yi(s), X
τ
−i)] ≤ E[cs′(yi(s′), Xτ−i)] +
√
8bm4+ 3bm
n
since any xτ satisfying
the condition Φ(xτ ) ≤ Φ(q) + 4 must have cs(xτ ) ≤ cs′(xτ ) +
√
8bm4 along with Inequality (25). Note that
bm
n
can be large in general to make such equilibrium less meaningful due to bad approximation, yet the difference
bound is much smaller for some classes of structures of allowed paths. For example, in load-balancing games,
E[cs(X
τ )] ≤ E[cs′(Xτ )] +
√
8bm4+ 3b
n
since any s consists of only one edge, instead of at most m edges.
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together imply that E[cs(X
τ )] − Bmn ≤ E[cs′(Xτ )] +
√
8bm4 ≤ E[cs′(Xτ )] +
√
8bm4, which gives
that E[cs(X
τ )] ≤ E[cs′(Xτ )] +
√
8bm4+ Bmn , where Xτ is the choice vector sampled according to
xτ .
Bm
n can be large in general to make such equilibrium meaningless due to bad approximation.
Nevertheless, there are natural cases when such approximate equilibrium is meaningful. As men-
tioned in Proposition 13, for classes of cost functions with small B, small Bmn can be obtained to
give meaningful δ-equilibria. For example, in particular for linear cost functions where B = 0,
E[cs(X
τ )] ≤ E[cs′(Xτ )] +
√
8bm4 since E[cs(Xτ )] = cs(xτ ) for any s; more generally, even if B is
not 0, it could be inherently small enough for some classes of cost functions to make Bmn small,
recalling that B (defined in Section 2) is a constant with respect to the load, not necessarily to mn .
For some classes of structures of allowed paths, the difference bound is smaller. For example, in
load-balancing games of [29], it becomes that E[cs(X
τ )] ≤ E[cs′(Xτ )] +
√
8bm4 + Bn since any s
consists of only one edge, instead of at most m edges. Using similar analyses to those in Section 3.3,
we can also derive bounds on the ratio of a social cost at convergence to that at optimum.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We show that the mirror-descent dynamics converges to an approximate equilibrium in nonatomic
congestion games. We do this by observing that the dynamics corresponds to a mirror-descent
process on a convex potential function of such a game and then proving that the process converges
to the minimum of the function. Moreover, we provide bounds on the outcome quality achieved by
our dynamics in terms of two social costs: the average individual cost and the maximum individual
cost. Finally, we propose a new family of bandit algorithms and show that when each player
adopt such an algorithm in an atomic congestion game, their actual joint strategy profile quickly
approaches an approximate Nash equilibrium.
There may be other no-regret or even other learning algorithms which could guarantee nice
convergence properties or simply good quality of outcomes. There are more learning algorithms
and dynamics to be explored in repeated games, while classes of games are even more numerous.
Beyond learning, there is still a variety of different dynamics to consider in repeated games.
A different line of future work would be to consider appropriate bandit scenarios for market
equilibrium problems and to see if generalized mirror-descents with approximate gradients also
work there. Yet another line of work could be extending our framework to other partial-information
models by other suitable gradient estimation methods.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that
Φ(x) =
∑
e∈E
∫ `e(x)
0
ce(y)dy,
where `e(x) =
∑
i∈N
∑
s:e∈s xi,s. Let
ψe(v) =
∫ v
0
ce(y)dy
so that Φ(x) =
∑
e∈E ψe(`e(x)). Observe that `e is a linear function of x ∈ K, while ψe is a convex
function of v ∈ R as ce is assumed to be nondecreasing. Then for any δ ∈ [0, 1] and any x, x′ ∈ K,
(1− δ)Φ(x) + δΦ(x′)
=
∑
e∈E
(
(1− δ)ψe(`e(x)) + δψe(`e(x′))
)
≥
∑
e∈E
ψe((1− δ)`e(x) + δ`e(x′))
=
∑
e∈E
ψe(`e((1− δ)x+ δx′))
= Φ((1− δ)x+ δx′).
This proves that Φ is convex.
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B Proof of Proposition 2
Consider any x ∈ K. First, to bound Φ(x), recall that ce(y) ≤ by for any y, so that we have
Φ(x) =
∑
e∈E
∫ `e(x)
0
ce(y)dy
≤
∑
e∈E
∫ `e(x)
0
bydy
=
b
2
∑
e∈E
(`e(x))
2.
Since each player has a flow of amount 1n , we know that `e(x) ≤ 1 and hence∑
e∈E
(`e(x))
2 ≤
∑
e∈E
`e(x)
=
∑
e∈E
∑
j∈N
∑
r∈Sj :e∈r
xj,r
=
∑
j∈N
∑
r∈Sj
∑
e∈r
xj,r
= m,
which implies that Φ(x) ≤ bm2 .
Next, to bound ‖∇Φ(x)‖∞, note that for any i ∈ N and s ∈ Si, the entry in ∇Φ(x) indexed by
(i, s) is
cs(x) =
∑
e∈s
ce(x) ≤ bm.
Therefore, we have ‖∇Φ(x)‖∞ ≤ bm.
Finally, let us bound ∇2Φ(x). Consider any i, j ∈ N , s ∈ Si, and r ∈ Sj . We know that
∂2Φ(x)
∂xi,s∂xj,r
=
∑
e∈s∩r
c′e(`e(x)).
From this, we know that each entry of the Hessian matrix ∇2Φ(x) is either zero or at most bm.
Consider any z ∈ Rd. For any i ∈ N and s ∈ Si, let Γi(s) denote the set of paths in Si that
intersects s. Then
z>(∇2Φ(x))z ≤
∑
(i,s),(j,r)
∂2Φ(x)
∂xi,s∂xj,r
|zi,s||zi,r|
≤ bm
∑
i
∑
s
|zi,s|
∑
r∈Γi(s)
|zi,r|
≤ bm
∑
i
∑
s
|zi,s|
√
k
∑
r∈Γi(s)
|zi,r|2
≤ bm
∑
i
√∑
s
|zi,s|2
√∑
s
k
∑
r∈Γi(s)
|zi,r|2,
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where the last two inequalities both use the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Now observe that∑
s
∑
r∈Γi(s)
|zi,r|2 =
∑
r
∑
s∈Γi(r)
|zi,r|2 ≤ k
∑
r
|zi,r|2
and therefore we have
z>(∇2Φ(x))z ≤ bm
∑
i
k
∑
s
|zi,s|2 = bmk‖z‖22
for any z. This implies that ∇2Φ(x)  λI with λ = bmk, which proves the proposition.
C The No-Regret Property of Our Dynamics
Mirror descents is known to have the no-regret property even when the cost functions of the edges
can vary with time. We consider such a setting, where the actual cost of each edge at time step t is
cte(`e(x
t)), where `e(x
t) is the load of the edge in question at t. We will define a new cost function
Cte(x) as follows:
Cte(x) :=
{
cte(x) if x ≤ `e(xt)
cte(`e(x
t)) otherwise.
Under these new cost functions, the cost of any edge observed at time step t, cte(`e(x
t)), is actually
the worst possible and any further increase on the load of any edge would have no effect on its
cost. If this optimistic view of the costs were actually true, then the algorithm using bulletin-board
posting would perform exactly as the mirror-descent algorithm and thus preserve the no-regret
property. Yet, the actual cost of any strategy under the real cost functions c, when taking into
account the effect of the infinitesimal deviating agent (of a player), would be at least as bad as that
under the optimistic costs C. Thus, the performance of our algorithm is also of -regret for → 0
in regards to the best strategy in hindsight under the true costs.
D Proof of Proposition 15
According to the definition,
BRi(xi, yi) =
∑
s
xi,s ln
(
1 +
xi,s − yi,s
yi,s
)
≤
∑
s
xi,s
xi,s − yi,s
yi,s
=
∑
s
(xi,s − yi,s)2
yi,s
+
∑
s
(xi,s − yi,s) ,
which using the fact that
∑
s xi,s =
1
n =
∑
s yi,s becomes∑
s
(xi,s − yi,s)2
yi,s
≤ n
Λ
‖xi − yi‖22,
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as we have yi,s ≥ Λn for any yi ∈ K¯i. This shows that ΛnBRi(xi, yi) ≤ ‖xi − yi‖22 for any xi, yi ∈ K¯i.
On the other hand, for any xi, yi ∈ Ki,
‖xi − yi‖22 ≤ ‖xi − yi‖21 ≤ 2BRi(xi, yi),
by Pinsker’s inequality. Thus, we have the proposition.
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